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1. Introduction
In this paper, we propose lattice-theoretical methods to analyze the existence and
the order structure of Berge equilibria (in the sense of Zhukovskii) in noncooper-
ative games [Berge, 1957; Zhukovskii, 1994]. At a Berge equilibrium, each agent’s
payoff is maximized by the complementary coalition formed by all the other play-
ers. Given that a player chooses her strategy from a Berge equilibrium, among the
strategy profiles of all the remaining players, the strategy profile from this partic-
ular equilibrium will yield her the highest payoff. Indeed, if an agent deviates from
her Berge equilibrium strategy, the remaining agents become worse off, whereas
the payoff for the deviating agent may increase or decrease. This reflects some of
the common motivations in human behavior that influence strategy choices such as
altruism, reciprocation, cooperation, and coordination.a
aSee Güth et al. [1982], Forsythe et al. [1994], Fehr and Schmidt [1999], Bolton and Ockenfels
[2000], Charness and Rabin [2002], Arnsperger and Varoufakis [2003], for the emerging recognition
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Berge equilibrium provides an alternative solution for games that do not have
Nash equilibrium or that have multiple Nash equilibria. In contrast to Nash equilib-
rium where players take into account only own interests, Berge equilibrium models
a type of altruism under which it is possible to reach cooperative features in a
noncooperative framework. In particular, Berge equilibrium advocates reasonable
solutions to the social dilemmas generated by Nash equilibrium (see Musy et al.
[2012]) and to the coordination failures in the common interest games (see Colman
et al. [2011]).
The set of Berge equilibrium can be defined as the set of fixed points of
the joint best response correspondence,b which is defined in a different manner
than the standard Nash equilibrium arguments. Although one can always obtain a
nonempty-valued joint best response correspondence by taking the direct product of
nonempty-valued individual best response correspondences according to Nash equi-
librium, this is not the case for Berge equilibrium. According to Berge equilibrium,
the intersection of coalitional best response correspondences defines the joint best
response correspondence which could be in general empty. Therefore, to ensure the
existence of Berge equilibrium, there exist two main challenges: (i) the nonempty-
valuedness of the joint best response correspondence; and (ii) the existence of a
fixed point of the joint best response correspondence.
In this paper, we first provide a sufficient condition under which the joint
best response correspondence is nonempty-valued. Once the nonempty-valuedness
is guaranteed, then the problem actually reduces to a fixed point argument.
Since the notion of Berge equilibrium emphasizes the coalitions of players and
induces more coordination than competition with altruistic orientation, it has much
to offer under strategic complementarities. Because of this, in contrast to the earlier
contributions on the existence of Berge equilibrium that are based on topologically
oriented approaches,c we resort to lattice-theoretical methods that exploit the order
and monotonicity properties of games. In particular, we introduce Berge-modular
games in which the strategy space is a complete lattice, and the joint best response
correspondence is nonempty-valued and Veinott-increasing. By means of Zhou’s
[1994] extension of Tarski [1955] fixed point theorem to set-valued maps, we prove
that the set of Berge equilibrium turns out to be a complete lattice. Moreover, we
refer to Echenique [2005] for a construction toward the extremal equilibria, and to
Topkis [1998] for a monotone comparative statics result on the equilibrium set.
The paper is structured as follows: In Sec. 2, we give the definitions and theorems
that are used throughout this study. Section 3 includes the results on the set of Berge
equilibrium. Section 4 concludes.
bIn this paper, best response correspondences are according to Berge equilibrium unless otherwise
stated.
cAbalo and Kostreva [2004, 2005] study the existence of a more general version of Berge equilibrium
for S-equi-well-posed games. Thereafter, Nessah et al. [2007] and Larbani and Nessah [2008]
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2. Preliminaries
A partially ordered set is a lattice if it contains the supremum and the infimum
of each pair of its elements. A lattice is complete if each nonempty subset has a
supremum and an infimum. A subset Y of a lattice X is a subcomplete sublattice
of X if for each nonempty subset Y ′ of Y , the supremum
∨
X Y
′ and the infimum∧
X Y
′ exist, and are contained in Y .
Let X be a lattice. A function f : X → R is upper semi-continuous if for every
x ∈ X and every sequence (xt) → x, we have lim sup f(xt) ≤ f(x). Letting x ∨ y
(x ∧ y) denote the least (greatest) element that is greater (less) than or equal to x
and y, we say that f is supermodular if ∀x, y ∈ X :
f(x) + f(y) ≤ f(x ∧ y) + f(x ∨ y).
Let T be a partial order, and define a function f on X × T . The function f has
increasing differences in (x, t) if f(x, t′)− f(x, t) is increasing in x for every t < t′.
A multi-valued map F : X → X is Veinott-increasing if for each x, y ∈ X with
x < y, a ∈ F (x) and b ∈ F (y) imply a ∧ b ∈ F (x) and a ∨ b ∈ F (y). Finally, the set
of fixed points of a multi-valued map F : X → X is defined as {x ∈ X |x ∈ F (x)}.
In addition, below are the theorems we refer to throughout this paper:
Theorem 1 ([Zhou, 1994]). Let X be a nonempty complete lattice, and
F : X → X be a nonempty-valued multi-valued map. If F is Veinott-increasing,
and F (x) is a subcomplete sublattice of X for every x ∈ X, then the fixed point set
of F is a nonempty complete lattice.
Theorem 2 ([Topkis, 1998]). Let X be a nonempty complete lattice, T be a
partially ordered set, and Y : X × T → X × T be a multi-valued map. If Y is
Veinott-increasing, and Y (x, t) is a nonempty subcomplete sublattice of X × T for
every (x, t), then
(i) ∀ t ∈ T, there exists a greatest (least) fixed points of Y (x, t);
(ii) the greatest (least) fixed point of Y (x, t) is increasing in t on T .
3. Main Results
In this section, to show the existence of Berge equilibrium, we use an order theo-
retic approach from the literature on games with strategic complementarities (GSC)
in which the joint best response correspondence is Veinott-increasing. We further
propose sufficient conditions on utility functions for a game to have Berge equilib-
rium, in a similar way supermodular games are suggested for the existence of Nash
equilibrium.
Let G = (N, (Xi)i∈N , (ui)i∈N ) be a normal form game such that N is the set of
agents, Xi is the strategy set of agent i, and ui is the utility function for agent i. The
set of strategy profiles
∏
i∈N Xi is denoted by X with a generic element x = (xi, x−i)
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The following definition of Berge equilibrium in the sense of Zhukovskii is due
to Larbani and Nessah [2008].
Definition 1. In a game G, a strategy profile x ∈ X is a Berge equilibrium if
∀ i ∈ N : ui(x) ≥ ui(xi, y−i) for every y−i ∈ X−i.
For every agent i ∈ N , the complementary coalition, −i, has the coalitional best
response correspondence B−i : X → X which is defined as:
B−i(x) = {y ∈ X | ∀ y′ ∈ X : ui(xi, y−i) ≥ ui(xi, y′−i)}.





Note that the set of fixed points of B turns out to be the set of Berge equilibrium.d
Before proceeding to the existence result, we provide two examples in which the
importance of Berge equilibrium is highlighted. In the first example, all of the
strategy profiles are Nash equilibria. However, there is a unique Berge equilibrium
which yields the Pareto optimal outcome: (y1, y2).
y1 0, 2 2, 2
x1 0, 0 2, 0
x2 y2
In the second example, there exists no pure strategy Nash equilibrium, but there
is a unique Berge equilibrium: (z1, z2).
z1 0, 0 0, 1 1, 2
y1 1, 1 1, 0 2, 0
x1 2, 0 2, 0 1, 1
x2 y2 z2
As for the existence result, we first modify the definition of GSC by using the
definition of coalitional best response correspondences.e
Definition 2. A game G has strategic complementarities à la Berge (or, is a GSC
à la Berge) if (i) every Xi is a nonempty, complete lattice; (ii) B is nonempty-
valued and Veinott-increasing in x on X ; and (iii) ∀x ∈ X , B(x) is a subcomplete
sublattice of X .
Sufficient conditions for a normal form game to be a GSC are given as follows: (i)
every Xi is a nonempty, compact, and complete lattice;f (ii) each ui is supermodular
dTo prove this, take a fixed point of the correspondence; say x ∈ X. Then ∀ i ∈ N : x ∈ B−i(x).
That is to say ∀ i ∈ N , ∀ y−i ∈ X−i: ui(x) ≥ ui(xi, y−i); i.e., x is a Berge equilibrium. And, the
converse similarly follows.
eBecause of the characteristics of the best response correspondences, it is obvious that games
defined below differ from GSC (see Vives [2005] for a definition).
fNote that a complete lattice is already compact in its interval topology which is the topology
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in xi, and has increasing differences in (xi, x−i); and (iii) each ui is upper semi-
continuous in xi. A normal form game that satisfies all of these conditions is said
to be a supermodular game. Noting that a supermodular game is not necessarily
a GSC à la Berge, we introduce new classes of games. Our analysis starts with
two-player games.
Definition 3. A game G is opponent-wise supermodular if (i) each Xi is a
nonempty, compact, and complete lattice; (ii) each ui is supermodular in x−i, and
has increasing differences in (xi, x−i); and (iii) each ui is upper semi-continuous
in x−i.
Theorem 3. A two-player opponent-wise supermodular game is a GSC à la Berge.
A GSC à la Berge has a Berge equilibrium. Moreover, the equilibrium set is a
complete lattice.
Proof. First, every coalitional best response correspondence B−i is nonempty-
valued since each Xi is compact, and each ui is upper semi-continuous in x−i. As we
consider two-player games, the joint best response correspondence B is nonempty-
valued as well.
For Veinott-increasingness, we need to show: ∀x, y ∈ X with x < y, if a ∈ B(x)
and b ∈ B(y) then a ∧ b ∈ B(x) and a ∨ b ∈ B(y). Take any x, y ∈ X such that
x < y. Then take any a ∈ B(x) and b ∈ B(y). If a ≤ b, we are trivially done.
Consider any of the other cases: We either have a > b, or we cannot compare a
and b. Since ∀ i ∈ N : a ∈ B−i(x) and b ∈ B−i(y), we have
0 ≤ ui(xi, a−i) − ui(xi, a−i ∧ b−i) ≤ ui(xi, a−i ∨ b−i) − ui(xi, b−i)
≤ ui(yi, a−i ∨ b−i) − ui(yi, b−i) ≤ 0.
Here, the first and the last inequalities follow from optimality. Supermodularity
implies the second inequality, and increasing differences implies the third inequality.
It is obvious that each term is 0 which leads to a ∧ b ∈ B−i(x) and a ∨ b ∈ B−i(y).
Since i is arbitrary, a ∧ b ∈ B(x) and a ∨ b ∈ B(y). Thus, B is Veinott-increasing.
For increasing differences property, take any x ∈ X . Also, pick any a, b ∈ B(x).
By definition, ∀ i ∈ N : a, b ∈ B−i(x), that is
ui(xi, a−i) = ui(xi, b−i) ≥ ui(xi, x′−i), ∀x′−i ∈ X−i.
Moreover,
ui(xi, a−i) + ui(xi, b−i) ≤ ui(xi, (a ∧ b)−i) + ui(xi, (a ∨ b)−i)
by supermodularity. Now, using the optimality of a and b, we conclude that a ∧ b
and a ∨ b are also in B−i(x). Trivially, they are also elements of B(x). Hence for
every x ∈ X , B(x) is a subcomplete sublattice of X . This completes the proof that
the game is a GSC à la Berge. Then B satisfies the assumptions of Theorem 1.
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On the contrary, opponent-wise supermodularity does not suffice for the exis-
tence of Berge equilibrium for games with more than two players, because the
nonempty-valuedness of the joint best response correspondence may not be satis-
fied.g This obviously prevents the application of Zhou’s [1994] fixed point theorem.
However, any additional assumption that states or implies the nonempty-valuedness
of the joint best response correspondence would complete the sufficient conditions
for the existence of Berge equilibrium. Among several alternatives, we prefer to
utilize symmetry in preference orders. First reason is that there are many examples
of environments in the literature on GSC satisfying symmetry in preference orders;
such as aggregative games and coordination games. As a matter of fact, the set of
games is even wider if one steps out of the boundaries of GSC. Second, symmetry
in preference orders indicates that agents are identical in a sense, and considering
that individuals tend to care for others who are similar to them, it is perfectly
convenient for studying an equilibrium notion which incorporates altruism.
For the definition below, it is assumed for every i ∈ N that Xi = Y . Then for
every i, j ∈ N , we define a transformation Ti,j : Y |N | → Y |N | such that
Ti,j(x1, . . . , xi−1, a, xi+1, . . . , xj−1, b, xj+1, . . . , x|N |)
= (x1, . . . , xi−1, b, xi+1, . . . , xj−1, a, xj+1, . . . , x|N |).
Moreover, let L(x, ·) denote the lower contour set of x ∈ X .
Definition 4. The agents i, j ∈ N are symmetric in preference orders if for every
x ∈ X :
Ti,j(y) ∈ L(x, ui) ⇒ y ∈ L (Ti,j(x), uj) .
Definition 5. A game G is Berge-modular if (i) each Xi is a nonempty, compact,
and complete lattice; (ii) each ui is supermodular in x−i, and has increasing differ-
ences in (xi, x−i); (iii) each ui is upper semi-continuous in x−i; and (iv) all agents
are pairwise symmetric in preference orders.
Theorem 4. A Berge-modular game is a GSC à la Berge; thus, has a Berge equi-
librium. Moreover, the equilibrium set is a complete lattice.
gWhen there are more than two players, the nonempty-valuedness of B−i for every i ∈ N does
not suffice for the nonempty-valuedness of B as it would have been the case for individual and
joint best response correspondences according to Nash equilibrium. Here is an example in which
the utility function ui is supermodular in x−i, and has increasing differences in (xi, x−i) for every
agent i.
Let N = {1, 2, 3}, and Xi = {xi, yi} with xi ≤ yi for every i ∈ N . Define u1 : X → R such
that u1(x1, x2, x3) = 11, u1(y1, x2, x3) = u1(x1, y2, x3) = u1(x1, x2, y3) = 7, u1(x1, y2, y3) =
u1(y1, y2, x3) = u1(y1, x2, y3) = 3, and u1(y1, y2, y3) = 0. Also define u2 : X → R such
that u2(x1, x2, x3) = 0, u2(y1, x2, x3) = u2(x1, y2, x3) = u2(x1, x2, y3) = 3, u2(x1, y2, y3) =
u2(y1, y2, x3) = 8, u2(y1, x2, y3) = 12, and u2(y1, y2, y3) = 20. Now, B(x1, x2, x3) is empty since
B−1(x1, x2, x3) = {(x1, x2, x3), (y1, x2, x3)} and B−2(x1, x2, x3) = {(y1, x2, y3), (y1, y2, y3)}.
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Proof. For every i ∈ N , the coalitional best response correspondence of −i is
nonempty-valued. Utilizing symmetry in preference orders, we show that this prop-
erty is carried over to the joint best response correspondence. To prove this, take
any i ∈ N and any x ∈ B−i(y). Also, take an arbitrary j ∈ N\{i}. Given that
yi = a, this implies ui(a, x−i) ≥ ui(a, x′−i) for every x′−i ∈ X−i. In other words,
given that xj = b,
{z ∈ X | zi = a} ⊂ L((x1, . . . , xi−1, a, xi+1, . . . , xj−1, b, xj+1, . . . , x|N |), ui).
By symmetry in preference orders, we have
{z ∈ X | zj = a} ⊂ L((x1, . . . , xi−1, b, xi+1, . . . , xj−1, a, xj+1, . . . , x|N |), uj)
implying that uj(a, x−j) ≥ uj(a, x′−j) for every x′−j ∈ X−j . Therefore, x ∈ B−j(y)
as well. In fact, we have x ∈ B(y) since j is arbitrarily chosen; i.e., B is nonempty-
valued.
In a similar way as in the proof of Theorem 3, it follows that B is Veinott-
increasing, and that B(x) is a subcomplete sublattice for every x ∈ X . A Berge-
modular game is a GSC à la Berge. Theorem 1 applies. The results follow.
At this point, there are two remarks to be emphasized. First, in above definitions,
it is assumed for every i ∈ N that ui is supermodular in x−i, but not in xi. Hence,
opponent-wise supermodular games and Berge-modular games are not necessarily
supermodular. Second, the proof of Theorem 4 utilizes symmetry in preference
orders only for optimal strategies. Hence, it is possible to weaken the condition and
to extend the existence result for a wider class of games.
Beside the existence, the result that the set of equilibrium is a complete lattice is
essential in order to understand the order structure of the set of equilibrium. More-
over, since we utilize Zhou’s [1994] fixed point theorem, we can refer to Echenique’s
[2005] constructive proof. This constructive approach indicates a way to compute
the extremal Berge equilibria, that is the greatest and the lowest equilibria. Addi-
tionally, as the following theorem states, another result of the complementarity
literature is valid for the set of Berge equilibrium. This result is a comparative
statics property, a well appreciated property for the equilibrium set.
Theorem 5. Let T be a partially ordered set, and (Gt)t∈T be a collection of GSC
à la Berge. Define B : X × T → X × T to be the joint best response correspondence
in Gt such that for every (x, t), B(x, t) is the set of all (y, t) where y ∈ B(x). If B
is Veinott increasing in (x, t) on X × T, and B(x, t) is a subcomplete sublattice of
X × T for every (x, t), then the extremal equilibria are increasing in t on T .
Proof. We already know that the joint best response correspondence of each game
Gt satisfies the assumptions of Topkis’s [1998] theorem restated above. Thus, the
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We recall the aforementioned examples from the beginning of this section, and
assume for every i ∈ N that xi < yi < zi. Then both examples are opponent-
wise supermodular. As for Berge-modular games, below are two examples in which




B 1, 1, 1 1, 1, 1




B 1, 1, 1 2, 2, 2
Pl.1 A 1, 1, 1 1, 1, 1
A B
Pl.2
In the above example, Berge equilibrium predicts {(A, A, A), (B, B, B)}
which is included in the set of Nash equilibrium. In the following example,
{(A, A, A), (B, B, B)} is the set of Nash equilibrium. However, the only Pareto
dominating strategy profile is the unique Berge equilibrium: (B, B, B),
Pl.3
A
B 0, 2, 3 1, 1, 8




B 1, 4, 2 4, 4, 8




Providing a sufficient condition under which the joint best response correspondence
is nonempty-valued, this paper studies the existence of Berge equilibrium for Berge-
modular games and for GSC à la Berge. We prove that the equilibrium set is a
nonempty complete lattice and that it satisfies the Topkis’ monotone comparative
statics property.
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Bolton, G. E. and Ockenfels, A. [2000] ERC: A theory of equity, reciprocity, and compe-
tition, Amer. Econ. Rev. 90, 166–193.
Charness, G. and Rabin, M. [2002] Understanding social preferences and simple tests,
Quart. J. Econ. 117(3), 817–869.
Colman, A. M., Körner, T. W., Musy, O. and Tazdäıt, T. [2011] Mutual support in games:
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